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1. 
Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only, there is no cause to doubt 
but that the seed of religion is also only in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, 
or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other living creatures.2 
When Thomas Hobbes thus began his chapter “On Religion” in his seminal 1651 Le-
viathan, he made use of the word “religion” in an abstract way that would have been 
impossible a century earlier. At roughly the same time, “religion,” which as a Latin or 
vernacular European word had been almost entirely synonymous with “Christianity,” 
was also for the first time applied to non-European phenomena described by European 
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ning of the modern period were not simply the outcome of encounters with new (non-
European) forms of religiosity. They were also the result of intra-religious, even polemi-
cal, differentiations within Christianity following the Reformation. From sociology, we 
know that “the more differentiated a group is, the easier it is for the group to appropriate 
foreigners and the foreign,” but that this greater flexibility is paid for by “increasing in-
ternal otherness” (Binnenfremdheit).4 Considering that the religious concept of Western 
provenance is closely tied to the history of Christianity, one must ask whether the experi-
ence and assimilation of “internal otherness” in the shaping of the late-Enlightenment 
concept of religion at the same time enabled the overcoming of religious alterity vis-à-vis 
groups coming from outside. This is suggested by the fact that the Western Christian 
term “religion” was transferred onto Islam and Judaism (and later other religions as well). 
The classification of Judaism and Islam as “religions” happens only in conjunction with 
an “internal otherness” resulting from the religious schism of the Reformation.5 While 
one thus might assume that intra-religious internal differentiations – such as are also 
the case in Islam between Shia and Sunna – are central to the development of religious 
concepts, this assumption is complicated by considering cases from East Asia. There, a 
situation of religious plurality without differentiation – at least if we understand this 
term to have its prototype in a religious schism such as that of the European Reforma-
tion – dominated in premodern times. In China, three major traditions (Confucianism, 
Daoism, and Buddhism), which self-consciously defined themselves as distinct but dis-
played little tendency to engage in competition against each other, by and large coexisted 
peacefully,6 while in Japan combinatory practices of Buddhism and Shintō proliferated. 
Religious alterity was certainly easily overcome in East Asia, but it might have been less 
due to the degree of internal differentiation than to a long-established practice of assimi-
lation that was applied to teachings in the broad sense (encompassing both religions and 
philosophies in today’s understanding).
When studying transfer processes of religion and knowledge up to the Enlightenment, it 
transpires that challenges posed by the contact with other religions contributed to pro-
cesses through which a clear conceptual grasp of the religious field as something separate 
from other spheres of social action came about. In terms of the conceptual dimension, 
this means that in any given society or culture, something like a general concept of reli-
gion can be expected to have been formed after intensive contact with other “religions,” 
i.e., entities understood to be commensurate with the tradition(s) existing in that society 
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thus cannot be regarded as an isolated process within one religious group or cultural 
environment, since transfer processes, translations of terms and concepts, and religious 
contact usually play an important role.
Still, the term “religion” and its equivalences in modern languages around the world 
today are of Western provenance, which fact forces us to reflect on the applicability of 
the language we use in speaking about the problem of the concept of religion in inter-
religious comparison. The Christian Western shaping of the concept of religion presents 
a particular difficulty for the analysis of religious concepts in inter-religious comparison 
and contact. As with conceptual history in general, there is an “interlinkage of the his-
tory of things and the history of concepts”7 with reference to the history of the definition 
of religion. That is to say, the particular problems and experiences that gave rise to the 
modern concept of religion have inscribed themselves into this very concept. For this 
reason, the concept of religion cannot simply be carried over into the religious concepts 
of other cultures. Christoph Auffarth emphasizes that “[r]eligion, as can be gathered 
from the history of the term, is a concept of European religious history” and is formu-
lated “out of the perspective of an occidental position of Christian Antiquity”; it is a term 
belonging to a “Christian object-language.” Auffarth concludes that the term is therefore 
clearly problematic as a comparative term of “religious studies metalanguage.”8
2.
A methodological aid in confronting this problem of intercultural and comparative 
studies is to resort to object-level language, i.e., to take seriously how societal actors 
themselves have historically referred to the practices they were involved in.9 It is not we 
historians who were the first to think about the commensurability and comparability of 
the term “religion” to non-European phenomena, but rather those non-Europeans them-
selves who were in contact with European languages. Historical actors in early modern 
and nineteenth-century India, China, Korea, Japan, and elsewhere had good reason to 
identify some of their traditions with this newly discovered European concept of “reli-
gion” but not to do so with others. While sociopolitical factors cannot be ignored in this 
story, there is also an intra-religious dynamic to explain why the majority of Chinese 
opinion leaders in the twentieth century came to the conclusion that Confucianism is 
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ground between object-level and meta-level language in order to contribute to making a 
shared academic discourse possible that reaches across Europe and Asia and is sensitive to 
the European legacy of the term “religion,” while at the same time keeping the door open 
for comparative investigations across cultures. We will therefore not limit our analysis to 
the term “religion” in the narrow sense (i.e., only the European languages) but consider 
other umbrella terms used for “teachings” or “worldviews” that are part of the religious 
field in a broad sense. This will allow us to reconsider the widespread assumption that 
outside Europe there was no such thing as a general concept of religion in pre-nineteenth 
century societies.11
The aim of our endeavor is to extend the history of the concept of “religion” by an in-
tercultural perspective. We hope that the case studies presented in this volume show the 
relation between the rise of the general concept of “religion” (or other abstract concepts) 
and the processes of perception and understanding in religious contacts. Moreover, we 
ask whether it might be possible to gain further insights into the processes of translation 
and the export of religious concepts and maybe even into the limits of these exporta-
tions. Thus, we are interested both in the formation of the European concept of religion 
as well as in its transfer and spread and in the repercussions of these transfer processes on 
the European concept. In addition to these questions of the possibilities and limitations 
of the transcultural use of concepts of “religion,” this volume poses another question: It 
inquires not only into the application of the Western concept of religion in transcultural 
comparison but also reflects on how concepts of religion are organized and developed in 
different cultures and societies.12
Furthermore, we hope that the essays in this volume will not only be fruitful for the 
history of the concept of “religion” itself, but will also contribute to a history of percep-
tion. In current studies of the mutual perception of different religious groups in different 
historical contexts, the contemporary use of the term “religion” is often not taken into 
account.13 To make up for this lack of a conceptual dimension, we will focus on the 
question of how different religious groups tried to describe and “label” each other in situ-
ations of encounter and mutual perception. This “labeling” and the different attempts 
at grasping each other conceptually are important for the question of how one religious 
tradition saw the other. Whether a particular religious group recognized another group 
as a “religion” or whether it tried to distinguish itself from that group by labeling it as 
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is an essential part of a history of perception. We follow the scholar of religious history 
Barend ter Haar in assuming that labels “are used according to vague and often only 
implicit criteria, and are rarely based on close examination. […] Contrary to analytical 
categories (or generic terms) in modern scholarship, labels are, therefore, not used to 
analyse or describe. […] Labels form a kind of closed system, always accurate for those 
who apply them, and providing justification for actions against the labelled phenomena.” 
We differ from ter Haar, however, in not necessarily presupposing that labels always “are, 
or have been used to denounce certain phenomena.”14 To the contrary, value attributions 
associated with labeling can be rather ambiguous, as we will shortly show in our tentative 
sketch of the historical patterns undergone by religious othering (see Section 3 below).
To define the parameters of our undertaking as outlined here and to give a sense of our 
methodological approach to the problems it poses, it is necessary to first clarify what we 
mean by a general concept of religion. The contemporary understanding of the abstract 
noun “religion” in the European languages (and those non-European languages that have 
coined a congruous term) encompasses several dimensions, three of which we will single 
out and identify for heuristic purposes. First, there is the (relatively old) generic mean-
ing of one religion vs. others: “a particular system of faith and worship.”15 In this sense, 
European languages have allowed us to speak of several “religions” in the plural since 
about 1400.
From about this time onwards, “religion” started its career as a collective noun, becoming 
a key concept of European societies later on in the course of the Enlightenment. Beyond 
its usage in the plural distinguishing different religious traditions, the conceptual shift 
during this period made it possible to use the term religion in the singular, referring to 
something like an ubiquitous human ability and predisposition. Next to this under-
standing of religion as a universal phenomenon stands the borderline concept, in which 
“religion” is delineated from other, “non-religious” or “secular,” spheres of societal activ-
ity, such as law, politics, education, and so on.16 We find all these meanings overlapping 
in today’s “religion,” but they must by no means be actualized in one and the same word, 
and they have indeed developed separately in the European languages, where the first 
meaning is clearly the oldest one. The relationship between them, however, is not en-
tirely contingent. In the European languages, again, it seems that the two more abstract 
meanings of the universal dimension and the borderline dimension actually developed 
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languages, there is in fact an area of overlap between the three in many European and 
non-European languages.17
Equally, it is by no means self-evident what one should understand under “contact” 
between “religions.” Indeed, in many cases it would be problematic to treat “religions” 
as meaningful entities that can have an encounter, and the contribution by Daniel G. 
König to this volume will spell out some of the problems incurred by such an approach. 
Again, however, by privileging the conceptual approach, it becomes clear that in many 
historical instances, social actors in situations of encounter do identify with a certain 
(religious) tradition, which they juxtapose to that of another. These contacts can be of a 
broad variety of types, encompassing, e.g., the actual meeting of individuals, situations 
of warfare, or theological debates conducted in the pages of books. In all of these in-
stances of “contact” in the broad sense, issues of self-identity are negotiated all the while 
the Other is being defined.
3.
In a very abstract fashion, one could attempt to identify a common pattern that is by 
and large shared by many situations of encounter that take place over a longer span of 
time. While the following considerations do not represent a unilinear development, and 
while these phases overlap to a considerable degree, a number of actual historical cases 
from broadly diverging chronological and local backgrounds share the following modes 
of perception and description.
In the very early phase of a contact, with limited opportunities to get to more deeply 
understand that which is foreign, it is a common strategy to view what is foreign as a 
variant of that teaching or worldview with which one oneself identifies. Such a strategy 
has recently been described by anthropologist Gerd Baumann as the “grammar of en-
compassment”: “Encompassment means an act of selfing by appropriating, perhaps one 
should say adopting or co-opting, selected kinds of otherness.”18 This is precisely what 
can be seen in early contact between religious groups. Buddhism, e.g., was seen as a vari-
ant of Daoism when it was first introduced in China.19 As Antje Flüchter shows in her 
contribution to this volume, early modern Christian missionaries to India “discovered” 
traces of Christianity in the pagan religions they encountered there. When Buddhism 
began to spread in seventh-century Japan, the Buddhas were interpreted as identical to 
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been called “combinatory religious practice.”20 And the eighteenth-century Capuchin 
missionaries to Tibet were called “(white) lamas” by Tibetan Buddhists.21 The notion 
that the foreign religion is actually a sub-sect of the dominant religion with which one-
self identifies can remain a valid option long after the initial encounter, as is apparent in 
the identification of Islam as a heretical sect of Christianity in early modern Europe22 
or in Buddhist views of Christianity as an erroneous form of Buddhism, twisted into its 
deviant shape by the misguided teachings of Jesus of Nazareth.23 The perception of the 
foreign is initially characterized by distance, a distance that can be spatial, temporal, or 
cultural. Standing in such a distance, the foreign largely evades conceptual definition or 
description: initially, it stands outside “habitualized knowledge.”24
Distance, however, does not mean that one does not imagine the “Other” at all. On the 
contrary: As the contributions of Daniel G. König and Antje Flüchter to this volume 
show in great detail, travelers, merchants, missionaries, soldiers, and ambassadors all 
conveyed knowledge of other religious traditions existing in other countries to their 
homeland. Even if conceptually marked as “religion,” the distance remains intact, yet 
what was previously foreign has now become the Other, finding its place within the ac-
cepted worldview. Nevertheless, the attempts to conceptually grasp other religious ideas 
as religion are never independent of self-perception and its conceptual frame. Face-to-face 
contact, along with the examination of writings of other “religions,” leads to deepened 
knowledge. As a result of getting to better know the foreign, identification increasingly 
becomes impossible as a means of dealing with it. A new terminology, however, often 
does not yet exist in this transitory phase; rather, foreign terms which do not become a 
fixed part of one’s own language are then used to refer to that which is foreign. At this 
stage, the epistemological status of this foreign element within one’s own worldview is 
still relatively unclear and open.
Christian priests in sixteenth-century Japan, e.g., initially referred to by the Japanese 
words for “Buddhist priest” (such as sō), soon came to be called bateren, a word derived 
from an approximate pronounciation of the Portuguese word “padre.” This word, instead 
of referring to the function of the missionaries, emphasized their foreignness, and soon 
vanished from the Japanese language once the last missionaries left Japan in the first 
decades of the seventeenth century. The famous eighth-century inscription on the Nesto-
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rian Stele originally erected in Xi’an in China is a curious example of how religious lan-
guage works in the transition period from (little-known) foreign to (more well-known) 
Other. The wording of the Chinese text on the tablet is so unspecific that it is difficult to 
tell at first glance that this is the description of a Christian group. The name of God is 
given in a phonetic rendering of the Syriac “Allaha,” but is otherwise simply called by the 
generic name “true lord.” Christianity is, however, referred to as jingjiao, i.e., as a proper 
name within the general framework of “teachings” (jiao) current in China at the time.25
What was initially completely unfamiliar over a long term began step by step through the 
multiplicity of encounters to gain a recognizable contour and became integrated in those 
cultures’ worldview, even if this happened by drawing borders; in other words, even if 
distance was maintained. The attempt to understand, classify, and grasp the foreign leads 
to its description. It is only through being described and narrated that the “foreign” 
progressively becomes the “Other,” as Marina Münkler has argued.26 Only then is the 
foreign fully appropriated by subsumption into one’s own worldview. The terminological 
system is adapted accordingly, usually in such a way that the Other is clearly marked as 
such with a conventionalized set of phrases, or by modifying those words in use for one’s 
own teaching by prefixes or attributes referring to the deviation it represents.
Islam, for example, was for a long time held by Latin Christians to be a heretical devia-
tion from Christianity; it was only through the intensification of information due to 
travel writing and diplomatic accounts, as well as through the analysis of religious writ-
ings such as Petrus Venerabilis’s translation of the Qur’ān into Latin, that Islam emerged 
as a “self-standing” religion, even if a mostly polemical one at first glance. Another obvi-
ous example is xiejiao, the conventionalized Chinese label for heresies of all sorts, essen-
tially meaning a deviation from the correct teaching (i.e., Confucianism) and applied to 
all teachings recognized as such but judged to be unorthodox, such as Christianity in the 
seventeenth century.27 An opposite example is the title of the linguistic work of Nicolas 
Trigault, a seventeenth-century French missionary to China. His 1626 “Aid to the Eyes 
and Ears of Western Literati” (Xiru ermu zi) applies the label ru, typically used for Con-
fucian scholars, to Jesuit missionaries, who were his intended audience.28
It is only in this phase, when the foreign has become the Other, that another of the 
“grammars of identity / alterity” described by Baumann first becomes possible, namely 
that of “orientalizing,” which Baumann himself has argued to be particularly prevalent 
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position subject to reversal,” i.e., something that makes possible not only the denigration 
of the Other but also a “cultural self-critique,”29 exemplified by the modern urbanite who 
glorifies the way of life of primitive tribesmen. Orientalizing in this sense – becoming 
aware of one’s own shortcomings when facing the (still inferior) Other – may be seen 
in the case related by Thomas Kaufmann in his essay in this volume about Georgius de 
Hungaria, who spent two decades in Turkish captivity, yet in his account could not deny 
being impressed by various aspects of religious life in the Ottoman Empire, such as “the 
shining brightness of the praxis pietatis,” seemingly implying that such devotion had 
sadly been lost in Christian Europe. It is also visible in the fascination displayed by the 
Jesuit East Asia missionary Luís Fróis in his tract detailing cultural differences between 
Europe and Japan, e.g., when he describes the cleanliness of the Japanese, which is, he 
laments, so woefully lacking in his sixteenth-century Europe.30
4.
A final theoretical consideration concerns the heuristic value of looking at how heresies 
and heterodoxies were defined. The construction of a category such as “religion” is not 
complete until it attains some type of negative foil. Logically, two models of opposition 
are thinkable: One is the labeling of deviant groups, which are, however, in the final 
analysis still seen to belong to the larger field identified as “religion.” In the case of het-
erodoxies or heresies (the labels actually used vary greatly), this is usually the case: The 
teachings of the Other may be of the devil and deserve to be attacked, yet they are still 
regarded as examples of the broader category of religion. In contrast, other groups may 
be judged to fall completely outside of the scope of the religious. This process is typi-
cal of modernity when “religion” is established in such a fashion as to exclude groups 
on either side of the conceptual spectrum: one, “superstitions,” which do not deserve 
to be included among proper religions and which are treated with indifference at best, 
although modern states would not infrequently undertake to dismantle them.31 On the 
other end of the spectrum is the border shared with science or agnostic Weltanschauung: 
In contrast to the treatment of “superstition,” the exclusion of philosophies, etc., from 
the modern category of “religion” did not necessarily entail a demotion in rank, as the 
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By paying close attention, again, to object-level language, one may make out distinctions 
between labels such as “heresy” or “heterodoxy” (or “Ketzerei,” xiejiao, etc.), differences 
which are reflected on the sociopolitical level of having to deal with the Other in some 
concrete way. Not infrequently, the one theologically closer to oneself was regarded as 
more “heretical.”33 To some degree, the history of the development of a general concept 
of religion is equivalent to the overcoming of denominational sensibilities. The acknowl-
edgment of the equivalence of other religions implies the abandonment of one’s own 
superiority to a certain extent. While this is essentially a story of the modern age, the 
essays on premodern cases discussed in this volume represent the first steps of such a 
full-fledged acknowledgment.
5.
The cases presented in this volume, although coming from a variety of cultures, all in-
volve Christians as one of the two sides engaging in contact. The concentration on Chris-
tianity out of the multiplicity of possible encounters between religions in world history 
is due on the one hand to the arbitrary configuration of the field of history in Western 
Europe (from which all the contributors come), but on the other hand to the fact that, 
historically, Christianity has been the most aggressive in reaching out to other religions, 
mostly with missionary intention. The wealth of historical materials produced out of 
the encounter of Christians with representatives of other religious traditions is therefore 
unmatched in world history.
The other side is represented here in this volume by Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Confucians. While we have thus striven for breadth and while the cases come from a 
variety of cultures, the list is by no means exhaustive; the essays collected here can thus 
really achieve nothing more than to begin to address the many issues, questions, and 
problems raised in this introduction. Even when limiting the scope to Eurasia, some 
of the more prominent encounters are missing in our collection, most conspicuously 
perhaps that between Jews and Christians (referred to briefly by Antje Flüchter) and 
that between Jews and Muslims. Encounters between the latter two in the Islamic world 
were dense and took place on many different levels and occasions throughout the age 
of the caliphates. Important case studies for encounters and attempts to describe and 
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physicians, translators, or in administrative functions, and where interreligious dialogues 
took place.34
A veritable goldmine for linguistically complex interreligious interactions in the premod-
ern period was Mughal India. Just as Muslim–Christian contacts in the Mediterranean 
world frequently went far beyond simple labeling, in premodern South Asia, processes 
of appropriation such as translations of Hindu texts into Persian, the high language of 
Islam on the subcontinent, and of Muslim texts into the vernaculars of the region seem 
to have been dominant.35 That the issue of labeling the religious Other extends even to 
less institutionalized groups has been demonstrated for the case of Mongolia, where the 
introduction of Buddhism since the sixteenth century has led to the reification and new 
categorizations of indigenous shamanistic practices.36
The recent volume Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions includes chapters on Buddhist 
relations towards Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, among others. Impor-
tantly, the volume sets out from the observation that, in contrast to common notions 
of Buddhism as generally accomodative or as indifferent to other religious traditions, “it 
can hardly be denied that the confrontation with, the critical discussion and the norma-
tive assessment of, rival views and of one’s own views in relation to other views has not 
only been present in Buddhism from its inception, but continued to be so.”37 In light of 
the problems raised in the present introduction, however, the approach taken by the vol-
ume on Buddhism is self-declaredly “theological” and therefore by and large ahistorical. 
Moreover, only scant attention is given to issues of labeling, since it is “the question of 
whether we are not in danger of overestimating the impact of terminology. For whatever 
terms and categories we might choose, the basic problems and possible solutions indeed 
seem to be astonishingly similar.”38
Such an approach indeed seems possible only if one is faced with fundamentally theologi-
cal problems that are in need of solutions. For the historical reconstruction of encounters 
between religious traditions, however, it seems well advised to take semantics seriously. 
Not only are they indicative of perceptions and attitudes towards self and Other, but, 
in the final analysis, they are also a key to explaining social behavior in situations of 
religious contact.
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